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Comments
Formalizing Interspousal Transfers of
Real and Personal Property in California
In 1984, California had the simplest laws regarding interspousal
transmutations of real and personal property of all community
property states. Claiming that one's spouse had always referred to
his or her separate property as "ours" could be enough for a court
to find that a transmutation from separate to community property
had occurred. In 1985, California enacted section 5110.730 of the
Civil Code to help rid the courts of litigation spawned by the easy
transmutation laws. By 1990, California's transmutation statute
was considered the toughest of all community property states that
allow interspousal transmutations.
This comment examines pre-1985 transmutation case law and
the legislative history of section 5110.730 of the California Civil
Code. It then focuses on the bright-line test announced by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald and
questions the wisdom of creating a special statute of frauds law
for interspousal agreements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Classification of real and personal property in a community prop-
erty state determines rights and liabilities of married persons in that
property. Whether property is classified as belonging to the commu-
nity or as separate property of one spouse determines its distribution
upon judicial dissolution of the community or upon death of a
spouse.1 In California, community property is defined as all property
1. For example, in dissolution proceedings, courts can only divide the community
or quasi-community property of the spouses. Gerald E. Lichtig, Characterization of
that is not the separate property of the spouses.2 This definition
might imply that community property is more difficult to define than
separate property,3 and helps to explain the general presumption in
California that all property acquired during marriage belongs to the
community.4
The community property presumption is rebuttable by the spouse
seeking to establish the separate character of the property in ques-
tion.5 One method of showing that property is separate is to prove
that, although it may once have been community property, some
transaction between the spouses changed the character of the prop-
erty to separate property.6 Interspousal transactions have long been
Property, in 1 CALIFORNIA MARITAL DISSOLUTION PRACTICE 185, 187 (Continuing Edu-
cation of the Bar, 1981). However, upon request of either party, the court can divide
separate interests of the parties in real or personal property held as joint tenants or te-
nants in common. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). Effective Janu-
ary 1, 1994, § 4800.4 is to be repealed and replaced with an equivalent provision in the
Family Code. A.B. 3650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1, 76; see CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2650 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
Upon death, if the decedent died intestate, then the intestate share of the surviving
spouse is one-half the community property interest. The intestate share of the surviv-
ing spouse of decedent's separate property depends on the number of decedent's heirs
(other than the surviving spouse). The surviving spouse's share may be either one-third,
one-half, or the entire intestate separate estate. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(a), (c)(l)-(3)
(West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
If the decedent died testate, the surviving spouse is guaranteed the one-half share of
the community property that belongs to the surviving spouse (i.e., the testator spouse
may dispose of only the one-half community property that belongs to the testator). The
entire separate property of the testator is subject to testamentary disposition, which
means the surviving spouse is not guaranteed any share of the testator's separate estate.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6101 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
2. Community property is defined negatively in California Civil Code Section
5110. It states, in part, that "[e]xcept as provided in Sections 5107, 5108, and 5126, all
real property situated in this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired
during the marriage ... is community property . . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West
1983 & Supp. 1993). Effective January 1, 1994, § 5110 is to be repealed and replaced
with equivalent provisions in the Family Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat.
1, 25, 27, 29-30; see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 700, 760, 803 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
Separate property of the wife and the husband are defined in California Civil Code
§§ 5107 and 5108, respectively. The texts of §§ 5107 and 5108 are practically identical,
stating that all property of a spouse that was owned by that spouse before marriage, and
that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and
profits thereof, is that spouse's separate property. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-08 (West
1983 & Supp. 1993). Effective January 1, 1994, §§ 5107 and 5108 are to be repealed
and replaced with equivalent provisions in the Family Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3,
1992 Cal. Stat. 1, 28; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
3. The California community property system originated with the Spanish
ganancial system. Ganancial property was defined as that which is "held in community
by husband and wife, having been acquired or gained by them during the marriage."
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY I n.2 (2d ed. 1971). In addition, this property had to be acquired by onerous title
(by labor or valuable consideration) rather than by lucrative title (inheritance). Id. at 2
n.5.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
5. Williams v. Williams, 178 Cal. App. 2d 522, 3 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1960).
6. The statutes that define community and separate property rights are not
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recognized in California community property laws.7 Interspousal
agreements, which change the character of personal or real property,
are called transmutations. Transmutations are valid not only to con-
vert community property to separate property, but also to convert
separate property of one spouse to separate property of the other, or
to convert separate property of one spouse to community property.,
Prior to January 1, 1985, no formal statutory requirements existed
to effect a change in character of property." Indeed, courts had in-
ferred agreements to transmute property from the conduct or decla-
rations of the spouses. 10
In 1984, the Law Revision Commission (the Commission) recom-
mended formalizing interspousal transfers to increase "certainty in
the determination whether a transmutation has in fact occurred."'1 :
This recommendation lead to the enactment of sections 5110.710
through 5110.740 of the California Civil Code, which formalized
transmutations by requiring an express written declaration to effect
an interspousal transmutation.1 2 This Comment examines section
5110.730 of the California Civil Code, arguing that as interpreted by
the California Supreme Court, section 5110.730 imposes too much
formality on interspousal transfers by requiring an express written
mandatory. It is possible to contract out of the system. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., COMMU-
NITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 29 (2d ed. 1988).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (originally this right to
contract was given to spouses in the Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, §§ 14-27, 1849-50
Cal. Stat. 255). Effective January 1, 1994, § 5103 is to be repealed and replaced with an
equivalent provision in the Family Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1, 25;
see CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.710 (West Supp. 1993). Effective January 1, 1994,
§ 5110.710 is to be repealed and replaced with an equivalent provision in the Family
Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1, 30; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1994).
9. Prior to January 1, 1985, interspousal transfers of real and personal property
were governed by case law precedent. California Civil Code §§ 5110.710-40 were en-
acted on January 1, 1985. 4 STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA AND DIGEST OF MEASURES 647
(1984) [hereinafter Statutes of California].
10. See e.g., In re Nelson's Estate, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1964). See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Nelson
decision.
11. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Recommendation Relating to Marital Property
Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 205, 225 (1984).
12. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5110.710-40 (West Supp. 1993). Specifically
§ 5110.730(a) states: "A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless
made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or ac-
cepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected." Id.
Effective January 1, 1994, sections 5110.710 through 5110.740 are to be repealed and
replaced with equivalent provisions in the Family Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992
Cal. Stat. 1, 30; see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 850-53 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
declaration. Section II discusses transmutations of interspousal prop-
erty prior to the enactment of section 5110.730 of the California
Civil Code and demonstrates the necessity of imposing some formali-
ties on interspousal transmutations. Section III discusses section
5110.730 of the California Civil Code and its interpretation by the
California Supreme Court in Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald.,,
Section IV discusses some of the problems with the court's rule in
MacDonald and argues that it is overly burdensome on married per-
sons when compared to formalities required between unmarried par-
ties to real and personal property agreements. Section V compares
interspousal transmutation requirements in other community prop-
erty states, and Section VI suggests an alternative interpretation for
section 5110.730 of the California Civil Code.
II. INTERSPOUSAL TRANSMUTATIONS OF PROPERTY PRIOR TO
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 5110.730
Prior to enactment of section 5110.730 of the California Civil
Code, transmutations of real and personal property between spouses
were informal and easy. One theory for the evolution of easy trans-
mutations in California is that prior to 1927, the wife had no owner-
ship interest in community property.1 4 In an effort to protect the wife
and the community, any agreement or conduct by the husband that
gave the appearance of changing the character of husband's separate
property to community property was enforced.' 5
However, because not all transmutations favored the wife16 and
the community,' 7 an alternate theory of freedom of contract arose as
13. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990). See infra notes 59-
75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the MacDonald decision.
14. The Act of 1927 changed a wife's interest in community property from a mere
expectancy to one that is present, existing, and equal. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (West
1983 & Supp. 1993) (originally enacted as Act of 1927, § 161a). Effective January 1,
1994, § 5105 is to be repealed and replaced with an equivalent provision in the Family
Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1, 26; see CAL. FAm. CODE § 751 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1994).
15. See e.g., Estate of Raphael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 206 P.2d 391 (1949) (hus-
band's statement that husband and wife were partners in everything, coupled with filing
of joint income tax returns reporting income from his separate property, were sufficient
evidence that husband had transmuted his separate property to community property).
16. Durrell v. Bacon, 138 Cal. App. 396, 398, 32 P.2d 644, 645 (1934) (wife's
statement that "what is mine is yours and what is yours is mine . . . this money will go
into a home for us; it is just as much yours as mine" was sufficient to transmute the
character of her separate property into property belonging to the community).
17. See e.g., Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 P. 775 (1893) (holding that an oral
agreement between spouses that money earned by the wife during marriage would be her
separate property was valid to effect a transmutation of her earnings from community
property to her separate property).
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an explanation for the evolution of easy transmutations in Califor-
nia."' The freedom of spouses to contract with each other was first
codified in 1872.19 Such transactions were, and today remain, subject
to rules governing the conduct of persons who occupy confidential
relations with each other.2 0 In 1991, section 5103 of the California
Civil Code was amended to further describe the confidential relation-
ship as a fiduciary relationship.2 1 Any evidence of overreaching, mis-
representation, or undue influence by one spouse over the other voids
the agreement or transaction between the spouses.22 Though inter-
spousal contracts had to be in writing,23 case law established that
spouses could effect a transmutation of property by either a written
agreement or by an executed oral agreement.2 4 Even the spouses'
conduct could be sufficient to indicate an intent to transmute prop-
erty.25 Woods v. Security-First National Bank 6 and In Re Nelson's
Estate" exemplify the extent to which California courts were willing
to go to find a transmutation of property.
The court in Woods declared an oral agreement fully executed
upon the utterance of the words. 8 Mr. Woods brought suit to obtain
real and personal property that stood in his deceased wife's name.2 9
Before marriage, the decedent had stated that when they were wed,
18. WILLIAM A. REPPY JR., COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 39 (1980).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (originally enacted in
1872 as § 158).
20. Id.
21. Id. Section 5103 states: "This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the
highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair
advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to
the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners . . . ." Id.
22. Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 204 P. 583 (1922).
23. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 16, 1850 Cal. Stat. 255. Section 16 of the
Act of 1850 provides, "All marriage contracts shall be in writing, and executed and
acknowledged or proved, in like manner as a conveyance of land is required to be exe-
cuted and acknowledged or proved."
24. See e.g., Woods v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657
(1956); Carman v. Athearn, 77 Cal. App. 2d 585, 175 P.2d 926 (1947); See also, Estate
of Sill, 121 Cal. App. 202, 204, 9 P.2d 243, 244 (1932). (The court, in upholding an oral
transmutation, stated that "[i]t is well settled that separate property of either or both
spouses may be transmuted into community property and this may be done without the
necessity of any written agreement providing the agreement or understanding to that
effect is fully consummated.").
25. See e.g., In re Nelson's Estate, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1964).
26. 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956).
27. 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964).
28. Woods, 46 Cal. 2d at 701-02, 299 P.2d at 659-60.
29. Id. at 699, 299 P.2d at 658.
her considerable separate property would become community prop-
erty. 0 After they were married, decedent stated to others and to Mr.
Woods that "by reason of said marriage the property had become
the community property of herself" and Mr. Woods. 31 The court
found that the oral statements made by the decedent were sufficient
to cause a transmutation of her separate property to community
property.32 It was not necessary to change the way title was held to
real property, nor was it necessary to treat the property any differ-
ently than before her statements. The court reasoned that the oral
agreement was fully executed when Mrs. Woods declared that it had
occurred, that "[i]t immediately transmuted and converted the sepa-
rate property of each spouse into community property, and nothing
further remained to be done." 3 Woods also "removed all doubts as
to the validity of an oral (or implied) transmutation of real property
despite noncompliance with the statute of frauds normally applicable
to real property conveyances. ' 4
Less than ten years later, the court in Nelson was willing to look
at conduct as proof of an oral agreement to transmute separate prop-
erty to community property. 5 Mr. Nelson owned an apartment
house as his separate property. 6 He then married Mrs. Nelson, and
she worked as his secretary and managed the apartment building
during the marriage.37 Mr. Nelson filed joint income tax returns in
which he listed the income from the apartment house.38 Mr. Nelson
also repeatedly referred to the apartment house as their property.8
The court found that Mr. Nelson's actions of allowing his wife to
manage the apartment building, and filing joint tax returns during a
time when only community property income could be reported on
joint returns, proved that there was a valid oral agreement to trans-
mute Mr. Nelson's separate property to property belonging to the
community.40 The court was now willing to find a transmutation
based on express and implied oral agreements.
30. Id. Prior to marriage, Mr. Woods had been employed by Mrs. Woods as her
servant. Id. at 700, 299 P.2d at 659.
31. Id. at 699, 299 P.2d at 658.
32. Id. at 701-02, 299 P.2d at 659-60.
33. Id. at 702, 299 P.2d at 659 (quoting Estate of Raphael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931,
939, 206 P.2d 391, 395 (1949)).
34. William J. Reppy, Jr., Debt Collection From Married Californians: Problems
Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 143, 157 (1981).
35. 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964).
36. Id. at 142, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 354. Mr. Nelson acquired the property before




40. Id. at 143-44, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
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After cases like Woods and Nelson, California's law of easy trans-
mutation was criticized as "dangerously easy" '41 and as a law that
"invites litigation and tends to encourage perjury."'42 Easy transmu-
tations were also criticized for problems they created in determining
creditors' rights against husband or wife debtors.4 3 Generally, com-
munity property can be used to satisfy separate debts of either hus-
band or wife." However, a wife's separate property is not generally
amenable to satisfy a husband's separate debt, nor is a husband's
separate property amenable to satisfy a wife's separate debt.4 5 Easy
transmutations were used, for example, to deny creditors their rights
when debtor spouses would claim a transmutation of community per-
sonal property to a nondebtor's separate personal property.'8
In 1984, the Commission recognized there were problems with the
existing system and published its recommendations for reform. These
recommendations sought to bring the law regarding transmutations
of real property into line with requirements for transfers of real
property between nonspouses. 7 More importantly, the Commission
41. WILLIAM J. REPPY, JR. & WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 421 (1975). Reppy and De Funiak make a comparison of transmu-
tation law among all the community property states. As of 1975, California law was
clearly the most lenient, allowing a transmutation anytime a judge or jury was convinced
that one had occurred. Washington was as lenient where the transmutation was from
separate property to community property. New Mexico and Idaho required clear and
convincing evidence to validate a transmutation. Arizona seemed to flip-flop between easy
transmutations and the clear and convincing evidence test. But Texas and Louisiana were
at the other end of the spectrum from California. By statute, it was never possible to
transmute the separate character of inherited property, bequests, or gifts in Texas. In
Louisiana, transmutations from separate property to community property per se were not
allowed. Id. at 409-34.
42. Reppy, Jr., supra note 34, at 168.
43. For an extensive treatment of the implications of easy transmutations on debt
collections and creditors' rights, see generally Reppy, Jr, supra note 34.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 5120.110 (West Supp. 1993). Effective January 1, 1994,
§ 5120.110 is to be repealed and replaced with equivalent provisions in the Family Code.
A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1, 31; see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 910-11 (effective
Jan. 1, 1994).
45. Id. § 5120.130. Effective January 1, 1994, § 5120.130 is to be repealed and
replaced with an equivalent provision in the Family Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992
Cal. Stat. 1, 31-32; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 913 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
46. Interspousal transmutations of personal property were subject to immediate de-
livery and continued change of possession, or else they were held to be ineffective or
invalid as to creditors. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
47. California Civil Code Section 1091 requires a writing for all transfers of es-
tates in real property (other than an estate at will or for a term not exceeding one year)
that do not transfer by operation of law. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1091 (West 1983 & Supp.
1993).
intended their recommendations to "favor the community and mini-
mize litigation. 48 In particular, the Commission was concerned that
the rules favoring easy transmutation had resulted in "excessive liti-
gation in dissolution proceedings. '49 On August 30, 1984, Assembly
Member McAlister introduced Assembly Bill 2274 (AB 2274) into
the Legislature to effectuate the Commission's recommendations re-
garding interspousal transmutations. In the 1984 Summary Digest,
AB 2274 was described as requiring a "written declaration" to cre-
ate a valid transmutation.50 In 1985, California enacted sections
5110.710 through 5110.740 of the Civil Code as remedies to the easy
transmutation problem.5'
III. CALIFORNIA'S NEW TRANSMUTATION RULE
Sections 5110.710 through 5110.740 of the California Civil Code
collectively represent a radical change in the way married persons
may conduct transactions between themselves.5 2 Section 5110.710
codifies the rule allowing spouses to transmute community or sepa-
rate property. 53 Section 5110.720 addresses creditors' rights by sub-
jecting transmutations to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.5'
Subsection 5110.730(a) establishes a writing requirement for trans-
mutations occurring on or after January 1, 1985. 5  Subsection
48. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 207.
49. Id. at 214. The commission further stated that "[easy transmutations en-
courage] a spouse, after the marriage has ended, to transform a passing comment into an
'agreement', or even to commit perjury by manufacturing an oral or implied transmuta-
tion." Id.
50. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 647. The text of the summary
provides:
Under existing law, separate property can be transmuted to community prop-
erty and community property to separate property by oral agreement of the
spouses, or can be implied by the conduct of the spouses.
This bill would provide that, subject to specified limitations, married persons
may by agreement or transfer, with or without consideration, transmute com-
munity property to separate property of either spouse, transmute separate
property of either spouse to community property, and transmute separate prop-
erty of one spouse to separate property of the other spouse.
This bill would require a written declaration, as specified, in order for such a
transmutation of real or personal property to be valid, except as to certain gifts
of personal property between spouses.
The bill would also specify which law shall apply to a transmutation of marital
property made before January 1, 1985, and a transmutation made on or after
that date.
51. See supra note 12.
52. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5110.710-40 (West Supp. 1993).
53. Id. § 5110.710.
54. Id. § 5110.720. Section 5110.720 is intended to prevent a debtor spouse from
transmuting his or her separate property or share of community property to the other
spouse where the goal is to deprive creditors of their legal rights. The Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act is codified in Civil Code §§ 3439 through 3439.12. Id. §§ 3439-39.12
(West Supp. 1993).
55. Id. § 5110.730(a). Subsection 5110.730(a) states that "[a] transmutation of
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5110.730(b) requires that a transmutation of real property be re-
corded to be effective as to third parties.5 6 Subsection 5110.730(c)
excludes from the writing requirement gifts of a personal nature that
are primarily used by the donee spouse and that have no substantial
value in terms of the circumstances of the marriage.57 Lastly, section
5110.740 prohibits transmutations from occurring by a statement in
a will which purports to change the character of property before the
death of the testator.5
The effects of California's new transmutation statutes were clari-
fied after the 1990 California Supreme Court decision in MacDon-
ald.59 The question presented to the court was whether signatures on
standard institutional beneficiary designation forms, upon which con-
sent was given to the designation of someone other than the con-
senting spouse as beneficiary to community property Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRA's), were effective under section 5110.730
to transmute the IRA account to the separate property of the IRA
account holder.60 The court held they were not.61
Mrs. MacDonald was dying of cancer and wished to simplify the
administration of her estate and avoid any disputes.62 She and Mr.
MacDonald divided their property into separate estates in August of
1984.63 In 1985, Mr. MacDonald received a disbursement from his
real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration
that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the
property is adversely affected."
56. Id. § 5110.730(b).
57. Id. § 5110.730(c).
58. .Id. § 5110.740. Prior to enactment of § 5110.740, case law had allowed a
statement in a will that characterized property to be used to show that a transmutation
of property had occurred, even while the person who made the will was still living. See
e.g., In re Marriage of Lotz, 120 Cal. App. 3d 379, 174 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1981) (wife was
precluded from claiming gifts of furs and jewels to be her separate property because of a
declaration in companion wills that stated that property in either husband's or wife's
name or both was community property). See infra notes 112-13 for additions to
§ 5110.740, which became effective January 1, 1993.
59. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990).
60. Id. Mrs. MacDonald's written consent to the designated beneficiary was ob-
tained in March of 1985, only three months after Civil Code § 5110.730 was enacted.
61. Id. at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
62. Id. Mrs. MacDonald had four children from a previous marriage to whom she
wished to leave her property. During the trial, Ms. Gommel, a certified public accountant
in the accounting firm with which Mrs. MacDonald did business, testified that Mrs.
MacDonald wanted to separate her assets from her husband's to avoid any difficulties
between Mr. MacDonald and her heirs. Appellant's Answer to Petition to Review at 7,
MacDonald (No. S-012304).
63. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990). Mr. MacDonald's
pension plan was not among the property divided at that time. Id. at 265, 794 P.2d at
913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
defined pension plan and deposited the funds, which were undisput-
edly community property, into three IRA accounts at different finan-
cial institutions.64 Mr. MacDonald designated a revocable living
trust as the beneficiary, and Mrs. MacDonald signed institutional
forms in which she consented to the designation. 5
After Mrs. MacDonald died, her estate brought a lawsuit to "es-
tablish decedent's community property interest" in the IRA proceeds
for inclusion in Mrs. MacDonald's estate.6 The executrix of Mrs.
MacDonald's estate argued that the consent forms did not satisfy
subsection 5110.730(a) of the Civil Code because they were not
written agreements that expressly declared that property was being
transmuted. 7 The trial court found that Mrs. MacDonald, being
aware that she was terminally ill, sought to order her estate so as to
eliminate dissension between her husband and children.68 The trial
court further found that in keeping with her intentions, Mrs. Mac-
Donald signed the IRA consent forms expressly intending to waive
her community property interest and transmute that interest into the
separate property of her husband.69 The Appellate Court reversed,
finding the consent forms did not satisfy the requirements of section
5110.730 of the Civil Code. °
The California Supreme Court, in affirming the Appellate Court
decision, relied on its holding in California Trust Co. v. Bennett,71
where the court ruled that in order to create a joint tenancy, section
683 of the California Civil Code requires a writing that expressly
64. Id. at 265, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
65. Id. The consent forms stated: "If participant's spouse is not designated as the
sole primary beneficiary, spouse must sign consent. Consent of spouse: Being the partici-
pant's spouse, I hereby consent to the above designation." Id. at 272, 794 P.2d at 918,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
66. Id. at 266-67, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
67. Id. The executrix of the estate was Mrs. MacDonald's daughter from a previ-
ous marriage.
68. Id. at 281, 794 P.2d at 924, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 280, 794 P.2d at 924, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 266, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156. The Appellate Court noted
that while § 5110.730 did not provide the specifics a writing must contain to satisfy the
statute, the statute, by implication, "requires something more than the skeletal writing
before us." 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 458, 261 Cal. Rptr. 653, 656 (1989). The Appellate
Court opinion has been omitted from California Appellate Reports.
Judge Holmdahl's dissent was less concerned about the form of the writing. Judge
Holmdahl asserted that where a writing indicated on its face that a transfer of property
interest occurred, it was only necessary to inquire whether the writing effectuated the
intentions of the parties. The language and purpose of § 5110.730 would be fully satis-
fied if the parties' intentions could be ascertained and there was a writing. Id. at 460,
261 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
71. 33 Cal. 2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 (1949).
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declares the intent to create a joint tenancy.72 Similar statutory con-
struction of section 5110.730 of the Civil Code would require a writ-
ten express declaration that a transmutation of property was
intended by the signatures on the IRA beneficiary designation forms.
Though Mrs. MacDonald's consent was in writing, the institutional
forms did not expressly declare that she was giving up an interest in
the IRA proceeds.7 3 The Court did not prescribe words that must be
used to effect a transmutation, but insisted that the writing, at a
minimum, indicate that Mrs. MacDonald no longer claimed an in-
terest in the IRA funds.7 4 Further, the Court precluded admission of
any extrinsic evidence to prove the parties' intent to transmute
property.75
In summary, MacDonald created a bright-line test to determine
whether an interspousal transmutation of property has occurred.
Married couples now must have a writing to transmute community
72. Id. In Bennett, a rental agreement for a bank safe-deposit box had been signed
by husband and wife. It was contended that the rental card, combined with statements
made and the circumstances surrounding the rental, created a joint tenancy interest in
the contents of the box. The court rejected this argument by construing California Civil
Code § 683 to require not only a writing to create a joint tenancy estate, but also requir-
ing an express declaration of the intent to create a joint tenancy. The court's construction
merely gave force to the statute's words that a joint tenancy must be "expressly declared
... to be a joint tenancy" and "created by a written transfer, instrument, or agreement."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 683 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
However, it should be noted that § 683 applies equally to married and unmarried
persons. Anyone who wants to create a joint tenancy in real or personal property must
expressly declare that a joint tenancy is being created. The rules are the same for creat-
ing a joint tenancy whether the parties are married or unmarried. Id. The rules, however,
are different for married and unmarried persons who seek to contract between themselves
under the MacDonald court's interpretation of § 5110.730(a). Estate of MacDonald, 51
Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990).
73. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 267 n.4, 794 P.2d 911, 915 n.4, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 n.4
(1990). The court worried that Mrs. MacDonald might not know that she had any inter-
est in the IRA accounts. Thus she could not transmute an interest in property that she
did not know she had. The dissenting opinion points out that even if Mrs. MacDonald did
not know she had an interest in these accounts, she was put on notice that she had some
interest when the financial institutions required her consent before allowing a beneficiary
designation of someone other than she. Id. at 280, 794 P.2d at 924, 272 Cal. Rptr. at
166.
74. Id. at 267, 794 P.2d at 915, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 157. The court would have
upheld a transmutation had the consent form included a sentence that read "I give to the
account holder any interest I have in the funds deposited in this account." Id. at 273, 794
P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
75. Id. at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The majority looked to
legislative intent and found that the legislature intended to preclude reliance on extrinsic
evidence as proof of a transmutation when it enacted § 5110.730. The legislature's stated
intent was to reduce litigation in this area, and the majority believed it could give full
force to that intent only by requiring a writing that expressly declared the intent to
transmute property.
or separate property between themselves.7 6 Oral agreements, even if
fully executed, are not sufficient to effect a transmutation. In addi-
tion, the writing must be joined in, or consented to, by the spouse
whose interest is adversely affected, and it must clearly show that
the consenting spouse is giving up an interest in the property. Lastly,
the writing must indicate that the character of the property is chang-
ing. No longer will the courts look to extrinsic evidence, such as con-
duct, to support a claim of a transmutation.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE MACDONALD STANDARD
The MacDonald standard poses some problems by interpreting
section 5110.730 of the California Civil Code as a "special Statute
of Frauds" law." The Commission had criticized California law for
permitting transfers of property between spouses "notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds. '7 8 In the comments accompanying the recom-
mended text of section 5110.730, the Commission stated that
"[s]ection 5110.730 makes clear that the ordinary rules and formali-
ties applicable to real property transfers apply also to transmutations
of real property between spouses" and that case law, which permits
the oral transmutation of personal property between spouses, is over-
ruled. 9 It is not clear, however, from the Commission's report that
the new transmutation law it was recommending was intended to be
anything more than a regular Statute of Frauds law.80 Nor is it clear
76. This Comment does not deal with the exception stated in California Civil Code
§ 5110.730(c), which excludes from a writing gifts of a personal nature (jewelry, cloth-
ing) that do not have substantial value compared to the circumstances of the marriage.
However, it is foreseeable that this exception could foster litigation. When married per-
sons are divorcing, or when a decedent's children from a previous marriage are trying to
include as much property in their parent's estate as possible, it is likely that the value of
a personal item will be highly contested.
For example, it will be argued that a diamond ring a husband gave to his wife two
years ago as a present on their anniversary has substantial value compared to the circum-
stances of the marriage when the husband and wife seek a divorce. A husband trying to
claim the ring as community property will argue that a transmutation to the wife's sepa-
rate property did not occur because a gift card did not expressly declare that a transmu-
tation was occurring.
Likewise, if a husband gave his wife a diamond ring, the wife's children from her
previous marriage will try hard to show that the ring's value was unsubstantial. If the
ring's value can be shown to not be substantial, then § 5110.730(a) will not apply. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5110.730(c) (West Supp. 1993).
77. In re Marriage of Weaver, 224 Cal. App. 3d 478, 484-85, 273 Cal. Rptr. 696,
699 (1990); In re Marriage of Hilke, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1323, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333,
336 (1992) (quoting In re Marriage of Weaver, 224 Cal. App. 3d 478, 484-85, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 696, 699 (1990)).
78. LAw REvisIoN COMMSSION, supra note 11, at 213.
79. Id. at 225.
80. MacDonald interprets § 5110.730(a) more strictly than other statutes that
regulate real property transfers. California Civil Code § 1091, which deals with real
property conveyances, is a regular Statute of Frauds law. Section 1091 states: "An estate
in real property, other than an estate at will or for a term not exceeding one year, can be
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that the Commission sought to preclude standard equitable remedies
that are available to remove a contract from the Statute of Frauds or
to preclude a showing that the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable to
the agreement.81
For example, in Hall v. Hall, the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act (UPAA) 2 was interpreted as a Statute of Frauds law. 5 Pre-
marital agreements, also known as antenuptial agreements, are de-
fined as agreements between persons contemplating marriage which
become effective upon marriage.8 4 They must also be in writing and
signed by both parties.8 5 However, in Hall, the Court of Appeals
upheld the validity of an oral antenuptial agreement where the wife
paid the husband $10,000 and retired, taking early social security
benefits in exchange for a life estate in the husband's residence. 86
The court determined that the antenuptial agreement modified the
husband's existing trust to create a life estate in his wife. 87 The court
then reasoned that "the framers of the uniform act were well versed
in the statute of frauds and knew about the exceptions applied to the
writing requirement."88 Here, Mrs. Hall retired and took early social
security benefits, providing sufficient part performance for the court
transferred only by operation of law, or by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the
party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1091 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
81. California Civil Code § 1624 is the California Statute of Frauds provision,
which specifies that contracts are "invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum
thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's
agent." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
The Statute of Frauds was enacted in England in 1677 to prevent perjury and uncer-
tainty that arose with oral promises. However, it was recognized that situations could
arise where equity demanded that a contract be found to exist even where there was'no
writing. Thus, in order to prevent injustice, the Statute of Frauds does not apply where
an oral contract is fully performed. Doctrines of estoppel and part performance, where
the conduct unequivocally refers to the existence of a contract, are similarly used to
make the Statute of Frauds inapplicable when equity demands that a contract be found
to exist. 2A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 275, §§ 421-422 (1950 &
Supp. 1992).
82. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5300-17 (West Supp. 1993). The UPAA became effective
January 1, 1986, one year after the new interspousal transmutation rule. Effective Janu-
ary 1, 1994, §§ 5300-17 are to be repealed and replaced with equivalent sections of the
Family Code. A.B. 2650, ch. 162, § 3, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1-2, 38-40; see CAL. FAM. CODE
§9 1600-01, 1610-17 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
83. 222 Cal. App. 3d 578, 585, 271 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (1990).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5310(a) (West Supp. 1993).
85. Id. § 5311.
86. 222 Cal. App. 3d 578, 271 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1990).
87. Id. at 583, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 776. The court found no evidence of a transmuta-
tion of property between Mr. and Mrs. Hall. Id.
88. Id. at 587, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
to take the oral contract outside of the scope of the Statute of
Frauds."9
Another example of contractual relationships that are governed by
the Statute of Frauds is agreements between couples living together
where neither the man nor the woman believe that they are mar-
ried.90 In Marvin v. Marvin, Michele Triolo and Lee Marvin orally
agreed to share equally all property, whether acquired individually
or jointly.9' Michele gave up her career to become a homemaker,
housekeeper, and companion to Lee.92 When their seven-year rela-
tionship ended, Michele sued to enforce the oral contract for half the
property acquired during their relationship and for support pay-
ments.93 The Supreme Court of California held that express con-
tracts between unmarried couples should be upheld, and that absent
an express contract, "the courts may look to a variety of other reme-
dies in order to protect the parties' lawful expectations. The courts
may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract . . . or some other
tacit understanding between the parties. 94
Hall and Marvin involve contractual relationships between per-
sons either contemplating marriage or living together without the
benefit of marriage. Courts have upheld oral agreements based on
part performance by a prospective spouse and conduct by a woman
cohabitating with a man. They have validated agreements made be-
tween unmarried persons where, had they been married, no such val-
idation would have occurred. Unlike married persons, agreements
between these unmarried parties are not subject to the strict rules
governing the conduct of persons who occupy confidential and fiduci-
ary relations with each other. However, Marvin and Hall relation-
ships are not so different from marital relationships that they
warrant different legal treatment when the parties choose to contract
89. Id. "Her performance constituted detrimental reliance on his promise sufficient
to allow enforcement of the contract." Id. at 587, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
90. Prior to Marvin v. Marvin, these relationships were called meretricious rela-
tionships. Today, they are commonly referred to as Marvin relationships. Marvin v. Mar-
vin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
91. Id. The alleged oral contract between Lee and Michele is similar to the com-
munity property presumption stated in California Civil Code § 5110. Where Lee and
Michele agreed to share equally all property acquired during the period they lived to-
gether, § 5110 states the presumption that all real or personal property acquired during
the marriage is community property. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 5110 (1983 & Supp. 1993).
92. Id.
93. Id. The trial court granted judgment for Lee based on the pleadings.
94. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr at 831. The court was willing to
enforce an express or implied contract between unmarried persons, except where consid-
eration for the contract was founded solely on "meretricious sexual services." Id. at 665,
557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr at 819.
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
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with each other. For example, Marvin relationships often resemble
marital relationships, and can be, in all respects except legal, indis-
tinguishable from marital relationships. Premarital agreements, like
the one in Hall, are made between two people contemplating mar-
riage.96 It is a paradox that the premarital agreement is only valid
upon marriage where a confidential and fiduciary relationship exists
between the man and woman, though the contract itself is not sub-
ject to rules governing people in such a relationship.97 There seems
to be no compelling reason for the different treatment given to agree-
ments between married persons and agreements between persons in
Hall or Marvin situations.
In fact, given the Commission's express intention to bring the law
for agreements between spouses into line with agreements between
nonspouses, it seems that the transmutation law, as interpreted, has
not met that goal.98 In addition, the Commission expressed concern
over extensive litigation generated by oral transmutations. 9 Surely,
the special Statute of Frauds interpretation given to section
5110.730 will reduce litigation regarding transmutations. But, should
not husbands and wives be treated "neither better nor worse than
third parties with contract claims," and does not equity demand that
relief be granted where the facts support it?1°°
Another example of a problem created by MacDonald involves the
creation of joint tenancies and In re Marriage of Lucas situations.'0 1
In Lucas, the wife had used separate property as a down payment on
the family home. Husband and wife took title as "Gerald E. Lucas
and Brenda G. Lucas, Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants", thus
satisfying section 683 of the California Civil Code for the creation of
a valid joint tenancy.10 2 A loan was taken for the balance of the
purchase price; payments on the loan were made with community
96. Id. § 5310(a).
97. Id. §§ 5310(a), 5103.
98. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
100. Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California's Commu-
nity Property Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 262 (1982).
Bruch argues that courts exist to resolve disputes, and that husbands and wives should be
allowed to disagree as often as other contracting parties do. Where requirements are too
strict regarding not only a writing requirement, but also the disallowal of extrinsic evi-
dence to prove the existence of an agreement, only the "disadvantaged" and "unsophisti-
cated" suffer.
101. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853
(1980).
102. Id. at 811, 614 P.2d at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
property.103 Upon divorce, Brenda sought reimbursement of her sep-
arate property contribution to the home.104 The court ruled that the
community property presumption raised by section 5110 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code could not be rebutted absent a contrary agreement
between the spouses.105 This agreement could be oral or written.106
In effect, absent an agreement, Brenda had effectuated a transmuta-
tion of her separate property into the co-ownership form of interest
specified by the form of title.
The question that arises now is whether Lucas-type transmuta-
tions are still viable after MacDonald. The deed in Lucas which
granted title to Gerald and Brenda Lucas as joint tenants did not
indicate that Brenda was giving up any interest in her separate prop-
erty interest (i.e., her down payment). Her signature on the deed
was only a consent as to the form of title. This is similar to Mrs.
MacDonald's consent to the designation of a beneficiary other than
herself, where she, too, did not expressly state that she was giving up
her interest in the IRA accounts. After MacDonald, it appears that
Brenda's down payment would remain her separate property, and no
transmutation would occur.
An argument has been forwarded that MacDonald will not signal
an end to Lucas-type transmutations because the agreement that
would have to be made for the separate character of the down pay-
ment to remain intact would be an agreement "seeking not to
achieve a transmutation but to prevent a transmutation. 10 7 This
means that to achieve a transmutation the writing and express decla-
ration requirements of section 5110.730 must be satisfied, but to pre-
vent a transmutation any agreement (oral or written) will suffice. If
no agreement to prevent a transmutation can be proved, can this
mean that a transmutation has occurred without a section 5110.730
agreement? It is doubtful that is what the Legislature or the Com-
mission intended. Not only did the Commission seek to end easy
transmutations, its stated intent was to increase "certainty in deter-
mining whether"10 8 transmutations had occurred and to "favor the
community and minimize litigation."' 1 9 A scheme that treats at-
tempts to achieve and prevent transmutations differently (instead of
as opposite sides of a coin) invites litigation by reducing the cer-
tainty of whether a transmutation has occurred.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
106. Id.
107. William A. Reppy Jr., Tricky Transmutation Law in California, DIvoRcE
LiTG., Nov. 1990, at 1, 2. Reppy argues that agreements entered into to prevent trans-
mutations are not controlled by California Civil Code § 5110.730.
108. LAW REvIsIoN COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 225.
109. Id. at 207.
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In addition, it is worth noting that estate planners, banks, and
other businesses were left scrambling to ensure that forms and writ-
ings used to transmute property would be sufficient to effectuate a
transmutation under the MacDonald court's interpretation of the
new statute.110 Persons who had executed will substitutes, such as
Totten trusts,"1 where the language is insufficient to satisfy the
proper transfer words of section 5110.730, were left in doubt about
their efficacy after MacDonald. So too, were those who had taken
out life insurance policies, whose beneficiary designation forms are
similar to the MacDonald IRA consent forms.
The California Legislature responded to these issues by introduc-
ing Assembly Bill 1719.112 This bill was approved by the Governor
on May 8, 1992 and became effective January 1, 1993. The bill,
which amended provisions of the California Civil and Probate Codes,
applies to nonprobate transfers made before, on, or after January 1,
1993.118 Section 5110.740 of the California Civil Code was amended
so that a waiver of benefits under the federal Retirement Equity Act
of 1984 will not be considered a transmutation of the "community
property rights of the person executing the waiver."' 4 Further, sec-
tion 5110.740 was amended to provide that a written consent or join-
der to a nonprobate transfer of community property on death is a
110. This Comment does not specifically deal with nonprobate transfer issues, such
as will substitutes, nor does it attempt to address the problems banks and other busi-
nesses face in their use of "institutional forms." For a thorough discussion of problems
and questions raised by MacDonald in the area of life insurance, death benefits, and
other will substitutes, see generally, Jerry A. Kasner, Donative and Interspousal Trans-
fers of Community Property in California: Where We Are (Or Should Be) After Mac-
Donald, 23 PAc. L.J., 361, 402-42 (1992).
111. A Totten trust is typically a contract between a bank and the depositor.
When the depositor dies, the bank will pay all money on deposit in the account to the
person for which it was held in trust. The account is listed in the name of the holder as
trustee for beneficiary. CAL. PROB. CODE § 80 (West 1991).
112. A.B. 1719, 1991-92 Reg. Sess., California Legislature.
113. Id. Assembly Bill 1719 added subsections b and c to California Civil Code
§ 5110.740. CAL. Civ. Code § 5110.740(b)-(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). It also
amended § 141, and added chapter 2, Nonprobate Transfers of Community Property, to
the California Probate Code. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 141, 5010-5032 (West 1991 & Supp.
1993).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 5110.740(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). A written, nota-
rized waiver of a right to a joint and survivor annuity is effective under the federal Re-
tirement Equity Act of 1984 to preclude the spouse executing the waiver from receiving
annuity benefits. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 USC § 1055
(1988). Subsection 5110.740(b) was added to be consistent with California treatment of
federal pension benefits. Pension benefits are considered community property to the ex-
tent that the benefits accrue during marriage, and thus are subject to division upon mari-
tal dissolution. 1 WILLIAM W. BAssMnr, CALIFORNIA CoMMuNITY PROPERTY LAW
§ 5.04 (1988). If a spouse waives joint and survivor annuity benefits, section 5110.740(b)
transmutation if it satisfies subsection 5110.730(a).115 Subsection
141(a) of the Probate Code was amended to allow a surviving spouse
to waive all or partial interest in "property that is the subject of a
non-probate transfer on death"; such property is covered under the
Probate Code commencing with section 5000.111 A new chapter in
the Probate Code, commencing at section 5010, was added to ad-
dress nonprobate transfers of community property, consent, and rev-
ocation and modification of consent requirements. In particular,
section 5022 reaffirms the holding in MacDonald that only written
consents to a nonprobate transfer that satisfy section 5110.730 of the
California Civil Code will be considered transmutations.118 However,
subsection 5030(c) overrules MacDonald by making any written
consent irrevocable upon the death of either spouse.119
V. INTERSPOUSAL TRANSMUTATIONS IN OTHER COMMUNITY
PROPERTY STATES
Other community property states have varying degrees of formali-
ties required to effectuate an interspousal transmutation of property.
States of particular relevance are Idaho, New Mexico, and Nevada.
These three States have either codified transmutations, treat trans-
mutations as interspousal agreements subject to the Statute of
Frauds, or regulate transmutations in ways similar to pre-1985
California.
Like California, Idaho has codified its rules regarding interspousal
transmutations by requiring all contracts between husbands and
wives that change the character of property to be in writing, and
ensures that the waiving spouse's share of community property will not be diminished;
rather, other community property will be used to offset the amount waived. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 5110.740(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
115. Id. § 5110.740(c). Where the written consent or joinder to the nonprobate
transfer does not meet the requirements of a transmutation under § 5110.730, it is gov-
erned by §§ 5010-32 of the Probate Code. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 5010-32 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1993).
116. CAL. PROB. CODE § 141(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1993). Written instruments
covered by Probate Code § 5000 include "transfer[s] on death in an insurance policy,
contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, certificated or uncertificated
security, account agreement, custodial agreement, deposit agreement, compensation plan,
pension plan, individual retirement plan, employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance, deed
of gift, marital property agreement, or other written instrument of a similar nature."
CAL. PROB. CODE § 5000 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
117. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 5010-32 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
118. Id. § 5022 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). It should be noted, however, that
Probate Code § 5011 (c) subjects all written consents to nonprobate transfers to the writ-
ten intent of the consenting party. Thus, it is not clear that a writing must satisfy the
language of California Civil Code § 5110.730 before a transmutation of property could
be accomplished. Id. § 5011(c).
119. Id. § 5030(c). Subsection 5030(c) does not apply "to revocation of a written
consent given by a spouse who died before January 1, 1993." Id. at § 5014(b).
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"executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as convey-
ances of land."12 Idaho's transmutation statute was recently inter-
preted in Wolford v. Wolford.1 21 In Wolford, the wife, Kathryn,
claimed that David, her husband, had transmuted his separate prop-
erty interest in CommTek Publishing stock to her when he wrote on
a cocktail napkin that Kathryn had a community property interest in
the assets and liabilities of CommTek Publishing. 122 However, the
Idaho Supreme Court upheld the lower court's finding that the note
did not transmute David's separate property interest in the stock.
1 23
First, the lower court held that the note was "unclear on its face
and did not appear to be a bona fide attempt to formally transmute"
David's interest in the stock."24 Second, the note did not meet the
requirements of section 32-917 of the Idaho Code, because it was not
acknowledged or proved.1 25 Third, the note referred to the assets and
liabilities of the company, not the stock; David owned no assets or
liabilities of CommTek, thus he could not transfer an interest in
them. 26 The court stated that Idaho laws require formalities in ef-
fecting interspousal transmutations. 27 The court further found that
Kathryn had "failed to sustain her burden of proving a transmuta-
tion; neither had she shown that the formalities required" in the
Idaho Code had been satisfied.112 Kathryn unsuccessfully tried to en-
force the napkin-note transmutation using the equitable doctrine of
quasi-estoppel.1 29 The court could find no actions taken by Kathryn
in reliance on a belief that there had been a transmutation of prop-
erty to her.130
120. IDAHO CODE § 32-917 (1992).
121. 785 P.2d 625 (Idaho 1990).
122. Id. The note was written in a bar and restaurant and stated:
06/25/82 - I David G. Wolford, being of I hope somewhat sound mind but of
broken body acknowledge that Idaho being a community property state, that
Kathryn A. Wolford, common [sic] known as Fetch, has an equal community
property interest in the assets and liabilities of CommTek Publishing.
David G. Wolford
Id. at 628.






129. Id. The court declared that for quasi-estoppel to apply, "[a person against
whom estoppel is sought] must have gained some advantage for [him]self, produced some
disadvantage to [the person seeking estoppel], or induced him to change his position."
(quoting Dawson v. Mead, 557 P.2d 595 (Idaho 1976) (alterations in original)). Id.
130. Id. at 630-31.
Like California, Idaho's transmutation statute requires a writing;
unlike California, the statute is a regular Statute of Frauds law.
Nothing suggests that extrinsic evidence would not be allowed to
support a claim that a transmutation occurred. Likewise, actions by
the benefitting party in reliance that a transmutation had occurred
will estop the supposed transmutor from denying that a change in
the character of property had occurred. It is likely that, had this case
arisen in California, the napkin-note would not have effected a trans-
mutation of property. First, because the property that is supposedly
the subject of transmutation is questionable (David only owned
stock, not assets or liabilities), the note would probably fail to meet
the California transmutation statute requirements.131 Second, while
David stated that Kathryn has a community property interest in the
property, he did not expressly declare that he was giving up any in-
terest in that property. It may be implicit that for Kathryn to have a
community property interest, David cannot own the stock 100 per-
cent as his separate property. But that will not be enough to find an
express declaration under MacDonald.32
Although New Mexico does not have a transmutation statute, per
se transmutations are governed under its general interspousal con-
tracting statute.13 3 In Allen v. Allen, the wife took property in her
name only when the parties were already married. 3 She later made
out a quitclaim deed on that property, transferring title from herself
to herself and her husband.1 35 During dissolution proceedings, the
husband claimed that the quitclaim deed executed by his wife trans-
muted the property from the wife's separate property to community
property. 136 The court stated that "[w]hile transmutation is recog-
nized, the party alleging the transmutation must establish the trans-
mutation . . . by clear, strong and convincing proof."137 Despite the
131. According to MacDonald, an interest in property cannot be given up unless it
was realized in the first place. Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 267, 794 P.2d 911,
914, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (1990). It follows that an interest in property cannot be
given up unless it exists in the first place.
132. See supra notes 73-75 and text accompanying supra note 76.
133. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-2 (Michie 1992). The provision is similar to Cali-
fornia Civil Code § 5103 prior to the 1992 amendment. The statute states:
Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the
other, or with any other person respecting property, which either might, if un-
married; subject, in transactions between themselves, to the general rules of
common law which control the actions of persons occupying confidential rela-
tions with each other.
Id.
134. 651 P.2d 1296, 1297 (N.M. 1982).
135. Id. The quitclaim deed did not specify the manner in which title would be
held, but stated, in part, "Sandra Allen for consideration paid, quitclaim to W. Ronald
Allen and Sandra Allen." Id. at 1298.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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quitclaim deed, there was no clear, strong, and convincing proof that
Mrs. Allen intended to transmute her separate property to commu-
nity property.13 8 Unfortunately, the court went no further in explain-
ing why it did not find clear, strong, and convincing proof that Mrs.
Allen intended to transmute the property. But, from the facts as
given, it is highly likely that the quitclaim deed would be sufficient
to create a transmutation of property in California under section
5110.730.139 Whatever evidence was allowed to show that Mrs. Allen
did not intend that the quitclaim deed be a transmutation from sepa-
rate to community property would not have been admissible in
California.
In Bustos v. Bustos, the court again used the clear, strong, and
convincing proof standard in deciding whether a contract between
husband and wife was valid to convey the wife's separate real prop-
erty to husband's separate property. 40 The court ruled that the hus-
band did not meet his burden of proof because there was strong
evidence indicating that he had exerted undue influence over his wife
when they entered into the contract.14 1 A cofitract for the sale of
land that appeared valid on its face would probably effect a transmu-
tation of property in California if it met the requirements of sections
5110.720 and 5103 of the California Civil Code. 4 2 The California
resolution of this case would have been the same.
Nevada, which still has no statute prescribing the method by
which interspousal transmutations may be effected, has relied on sec-
tion 123.220 of the Nevada Revised Statutes in deciding when a
transmutation has occurred.1 43 In Verheyden v. Verheyden, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court stated in a footnote that an agreement between
138. Id.
139. Quitclaim deeds convey whatever interest a grantor may have in property to
the grantee(s). While it does not guarantee that the grantor has any valid interest, it does
assume that any interest the grantor does have is given over to the grantee(s). RAYMOND
J. WERNER & ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW, 63 (10th ed. 1993).
140. 673 P.2d 1289, 1291 (N.M. 1983).
141. Id. Apparently, Mrs. Bustos needed money to help her son make some car
payments, and so accepted $2,000 as consideration for the land. The land, at the time of
trial, was worth $160,000. Additionally, evidence showed that at the time of the sale,
Mrs. Bustos was afraid of Mr. Bustos and was emotionally disturbed. Id.
142. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5110.720, 5103 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). Section
5110.720 operates to ensure there is no fraud perpetrated against a creditor. Section
5103, as amended in 1991, imposes a duty of highest good faith and fair dealing on
married persons and establishes between them a fiduciary relationship. If there is evi-
dence of undue influence or misrepresentation or fraud, the contract will be considered
void as between the spouses.
143. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991) (defining all
property acquired after marriage as community property unless there is an "agreement
spouses to transmute community property to separate property of ei-
ther spouse must be in writing according to subsection 123.220(1). 14"
Mrs. Verheyden was trying to prove that an automobile, purchased
during marriage, was actually her separate property because Mr.
Verheyden told her it was a gift to her.145 The court stated that the
presumption under which all property acquired during marriage is
community property could only be rebutted by "clear and certain
proof," and that Mr. Verheyden's oral declarations did not meet this
level of proof.1 46 The Verheyden court leaves us guessing as to which
reason was key to its finding that no transmutation had occurred:
failing the clear and certain proof test or having no written
agreement.
This ambiguity was noted, if not resolved, in Anderson v. Ander-
son, which involved a dispute during judicial dissolution of the com-
munity over the classification of money in bank accounts.14 The
Andersons had agreed to divide their joint account into two separate
accounts. 48 The division of the money was unequal, with $54,000
being deposited in Mr. Anderson's account, and $110,000 being de-
posited in Mrs. Anderson's account. 49 The Nevada Supreme Court
ruled that, had the issue of transmutation been raised formally on
appeal, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would permit the unequal
distribution of funds to stand. 150 The concurring opinion directly ad-
dressed this case as raising an issue of transmutation of property,
and stated that section 123.220 of the Nevada Revised Statutes only
defined community property, and did not relate to transmutations of
community property.' 5 ' The concurring judges believed that the oral
agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Anderson that accompanied the
division of the joint bank account should be enforced because Ne-
vada law did not require a writing or other formality to transmute
in writing between the spouses" (this includes provisions under §§ 123.190 (written au-
thorization required by one spouse for other spouse to appropriate and use own earnings
as separate property) and 123.259, or there is a court decree of separate maintenance).
144. 757 P.2d 1328, 1331 n.4 (Nev. 1988).
145. Id. at 1331. In addition, Mrs. Verheyden stated that the car had always been
referred to as her car. However, title was taken in both spouses' names. Id.
146. Id. at 1331.
147. 816 P.2d 463 (Nev. 1991).
148. Id. at 464.
149. Id.
150. Id. Mr. Anderson admitted that he had misled his wife to believe that the
division of money was permanent. There is nothing in the case that reveals that Mrs.
Anderson relied to her detriment on Mr. Anderson's declarations regarding the division
of the joint bank account.
151. Id. at 465 (Springer, J. and Rose, J., concurring). The case was decided by
five justices, three of whom joined in the majority opinion, and two of whom concurred.
The judges in the concurring opinion believed that Nevada's law of transmutation was in
need of clarification after Verheyden.
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property between spouses. 152 Until the transmutation law is clarified
(i.e., whether any formalities are required to transmute property be-
tween spouses), it is difficult to predict the outcome of the next inter-
spousal transmutation case in Nevada. However, a California court
applying the MacDonald standard would have found that the Ver-
heyden and Anderson agreements did not effectuate a transmutation
of the subject property because there were no written agreements
which expressly declared that a transmutation had occurred.
VI. AN ALTERNATE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 5110.730
The MacDonald decision has presented various problems: it cre-
ates different standards and requirements for persons who contract
between themselves based on marital status; it potentially leaves un-
resolved the Lucas-type situation; and it has caused upheaval in
businesses that use standard institutional forms. Given these
problems and the ways other community property states handle in-
terspousal transmutations, an alternate interpretation of section
5110.730 of the California Civil Code, one which would achieve the
court's holding in MacDonald that a transmutation did not occur, is
possible and workable. The basic writing requirement of section
5110.730 is sound. Requiring a written agreement satisfies the intent
of the Commission and legislature by reducing the amount of litiga-
tion spawned by the pre-1985 easy transmutations. 153 It also reduces
problems associated with contracts between persons who are not
transacting at arm's length. Additionally, a writing requirement
makes interspousal transactions dealing with real property subject to
the same requirements as contracts between unmarried persons.1
54
The problem with section 5110.730 lies in the MacDonald court's
interpretation of the words "express declaration."' 5 5 By interpreting
section 5110.730 as a special Statute of Frauds law that does not
allow admission of any extrinsic evidence to prove or disprove the
intent of the parties as to transmutation, the court disregards the
high likelihood that transactions between spouses will be informal.
Husbands and wives rarely put agreements in writing, and when
152. Id. The concurring opinion went on to state that if Nevada wants to formalize
requirements for interspousal transmutations, it should follow the lead of California, and
leave it to the legislature to enact a statute.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 48-49.
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (Statute of Frauds).
155. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110.730(a) (West Supp. 1993).
they do it is often in vague terms. 156 Though some formality in
transferring interests in property is necessary and desirable, it should
not be more difficult for married persons to create agreements that
will be upheld in court than it is for unmarried persons.' 57 Allowing
arguments such as estoppel and part performance of an agreement to
be made may increase the amount of litigation when compared to
the MacDonald standard, but "disagreements between family mem-
bers are as deserving of judicial time as are similar claims between
strangers," and "artificial barriers to recovery . . . are inequita-
ble."' 58 The MacDonald standard looks out for the court's interest at
a high cost to husbands' and wives' freedom to contract.
After the decision in MacDonald, the higher partnership standard
for married persons was codified in section 5103 of the California
Civil Code. 159 It applies to all real and personal property transac-
tions between husbands and wives.160 Section 5103 requires spouses
to be bound by the highest good faith and fair dealing in their trans-
actions with each other, and classifies the relationship as fiduciary,
subject to the "same rights and duties of nonmarital business part-
ners."'' This high standard by which spousal dealings are controlled
is arguably justified because husbands and wives do not deal at
arms-length, and because husbands and wives have historically
lacked formality in their agreements. Sections 5103 and 5110.720,
and subsection 5110.730(b) work together to ensure the integrity of
interspousal agreements as they relate to the spouses and as they
156. This is particularly true when giving gifts. Any writing that might coincide
with a gift of a diamond ring or a new car, which may not fit in the personal gifts
exception to § 5110.730, is likely to be in a card that merely says "For You" or "Happy
Birthday." Neither writing satisfies § 5110.730 because neither indicates the object be-
ing given nor expressly declares that an interest in property is being transferred to the
donee spouse.
157. An argument in favor of creating a different and more difficult standard is
that the likelihood of fraud, undue influence, and misrepresentation is higher in transac-
tions between spouses.
158. Carol S. Bruch, supra note 100, at 162-63.
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West Supp. 1993). Section 5103 was amended in
1991 to reflect the legislature's intent to further formalize the marital relationship.
160. Id.
161. Id. These "rights and duties" include:
(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a
transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying.
(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting
any transaction which concerns the community property. Nothing in this sec-
tion is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and
records of community property transactions.
(3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit
derived from any transaction by him or her without consent of the other spouse
which concerns the community property.
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relate to creditors and third parties.'6 2 While these code sections in-
dicate an increasing preference for formalities in interspousal con-
tracts, their presence also permits a less strict interpretation of
subsection 5110.730(a). In the absence of section 5103, the Mac-
Donald court's interpretation of section 5110.730 is required to en-
sure that no unfair advantage is taken of a spouse. With subsection
5103, the interpretation of subsection 5110.730(a) can be softened,
making it a regular Statute of Frauds law.
Allowing evidence of intent to transmute property can be governed
by standards that would not overly burden a court by inducing ex-
cessive litigation. For example, where a writing did not clearly indi-
cate a change in the character of property, an evidentiary standard,
like New Mexico's clear, strong, and convincing standard, would
have to be satisfied by the person seeking to prove that a transmuta-
tion had occurred. California has a similar evidentiary standard in
section 662 of the California Evidence Code.6 3 The Commission's
concern over the amount of perjury prevalent in litigation prior to
enactment of section 5110.7306 would be alleviated by a higher
burden of proof required to establish intent to transmute combined
with a requirement of highest good faith dealing in section 5103 of
the California Civil Code.
Interpreting section 5110.730 as a regular Statute of Frauds law
would address all of the concerns of the Commission. First, the court
would determine if there was a writing. If the writing expressly
states that the spouse is giving up all or a partial interest in the
subject property, the court's work is done. However, where the writ-
ing is ambiguous or where there is no writing, the agreement would
be examined to ensure it complies with the new partnership stan-
dards of section 5103 of the Civil Code.165 Evidence would be admis-
sible to show that full disclosure of property interests was made to
the adversely affected spouse, and that there was no undue influence
or misrepresentation.'66 That evidence would have to meet the clear
and convincing proof standard of section 662 of the Evidence
Code.' If the writing or oral agreement passed this highest good
faith and fair dealing test, then further evidence would be admissible
to show whether the intent was present to pass an interest to the
162. Id. §§ 5103, 5110.720, 5110.730(b).
163. CAL. EVID. CODE § 662 (West 1966).
164. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 214.
165. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West Supp. 1993).
166. Id.
167. CAL. EVID. CODE § 662.
other spouse. When the intent test failed, only where equity de-
manded, would doctrines of equitable estoppel or part performance
operate to make the Statute of Frauds inapplicable to the agreement.
If the spouse claiming the transmutation could show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that actions were taken in detrimental reliance
on the supposed transmutation, then, and only then, would a writing
requirement be waived.
In MacDonald, there was a writing agreeing to the designated
beneficiaries and a signature by the spouse whose interest was ad-
versely affected. However, the writing did not expressly declare that
Mrs. MacDonald was giving up any interest in the IRA accounts. In
applying section 5103 to this agreement, there was no apparent
fraud or undue influence by Mr. MacDonald. Previous attempts to
separate their estates would indicate that Mrs. MacDonald knew
enough to ask whether she had any interest in the IRA accounts.
Assuming that the consent forms would pass the highest good faith
dealings test, was there sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing
nature to show that Mrs. MacDonald intended to transmute her
community property interest in the IRA accounts? This is debatable.
First, Mrs. MacDonald could have believed that she was consenting
to Mr. MacDonald leaving his community interest to the revocable
living trust (i.e., not giving up any present interest). Second, Mrs.
MacDonald was deceased and could not express her true intentions.
The court may well have determined that the intent to transmute
property was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. A de-
cision based on the above reasoning would recognize that husbands
and wives are not formal in all their dealings, as courts have recog-
nized that unmarried persons are not always formal or clear in their
dealings. But, by requiring clear and convincing proof coupled with
the partnership standard for highest good faith and fair dealing, ex-
cessive litigation that tends to invite perjury would be avoided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The writing requirement of section 5110.730 of the California
Civil Code is a sound idea. Interspousal transmutations of personal
and real property prior to January 1, 1985 were too easy and en-
couraged perjury in judicial dissolution proceedings as well as con-
troversies between heirs and widowed spouses. However, the
California Supreme Court may have gone too far in interpreting the
express written declaration statement in section 5110.730 to mean
that a special, more strict Statute of Frauds law was intended by the
California Legislature.
The strict interpretation of section 5110.730 will continue to cause
problems in areas where joint tenancies have been created, where
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nonpersonal, substantial interspousal gifts are made, and where fair-
ness demands that an agreement that does not satisfy section
5110.730 be considered a valid transmutation of property. Adopting
a more traditional Statute of Frauds law interpretation of section
5110.730, like that given Idaho's transmutation statute, would allevi-
ate some problems without unduly burdening the court with litiga-
tion. Requiring a high burden of proof, like New Mexico does with
its clear, strong, and convincing standard, would alleviate many
problems of perjury. California's new "marriage as a business part-
nership" rule would further prevent problems caused by insufficient
writings where unfair dealings between spouses are possible. Lastly,
section 5110.720 already ensures that any agreement between
spouses will be carefully scrutinized to ensure creditors' rights are
protected. While a different reading of section 5110.730 may render
the words "express declaration" superfluous as they were interpreted
in MacDonald, it would have the benefit of treating agreements be-
tween married persons identically to those between unmarried
persons.
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